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On the inadequacy of the logistic map for
cryptographic applications
David Arroyo, Gonzalo Alvarez, Veronica Fernandez
Abstract— This paper analyzes the use of the logistic map for
cryptographic applications. The most important characteristics of
the logistic map are shown in order to prove the inconvenience of
considering this map in the design of new chaotic cryptosystems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chaotic cryptography has been an important research area
during the last two decades. The properties of chaotic systems
have been used in very different ways to build new cryp-
tosystems. All of those proposals can be classified into two
big families, which are analog chaos-based cryptosystems and
digital chaos-based cryptosystems. The first type of chaotic
cryptosystems is based on the chaotic synchronization tech-
nique [1], whereas digital chaotic cryptosystems are based
on one or more chaotic maps in such a way that the secret
key is either given by the control parameters and the initial
conditions or determines those values. The scope of this
paper is related to a subclass of the last type of chaotic
cryptosystems. More specifically, the present work deals with
the underlying problems of those digital chaotic cryptosystems
based on the logistic map. The logistic map is the most widely
used in the designing of new digital chaotic cryptosystems [2]–
[25]. Some of these proposals have been totally or partially
cryptanalyzed as a consequence of not fully considering the
dynamical characteristics of the logistic map [26]–[35]. This
paper analyzes these dynamical characteristics and explains
the problems of their application in the context of chaotic
cryptography.
II. CHAOTIC MAPS AND CRYPTOGRAPHY
The major task of criptography is to ensure the secrecy of
information. To do so, encryption methods have to be created
so the message or plaintext is transformed into an encrypted
message or ciphertext. The transformation procedure depends
on an external parameter called key such that it is only possible
to recover the original message if that key is known. As it was
required by Kerckhoff [36, p. 14], the security of a cryptosys-
tem should depend only on its key. It is also necessary that
the ciphertext generated by the encryption procedure does not
contain enough information to guess either the plaintext or the
value of the key, which also forces ciphertexts associated to
very similar values of the secret key to be very different from
David Arroyo, Gonzalo Alvarez and Veronica Fernandez are with Instituto
de Fı´sica Aplicada, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas, Serrano
144, 28006 Madrid, Spain.
e-mail: {david.arroyo, gonzalo, veronica.fernandez}@iec.csic.es
each other. This is the reason why chaotic maps have captured
the attention of cryptographers and many chaotic cryptosys-
tems, i.e., cryptosystems based on chaotics maps have been
proposed. The dynamics of chaotic maps highly depends on
an external value or set of values and the initial state of the
system, which reminds the dependency of the cryptosystem on
the secret key. Chaotic maps have also a noise-like behavior
that can be used to encrypt information through substitution
or masking processes. The next section introduces the above
mentioned dynamical properties of chaotic maps and their
special behavior.
III. DISCRETE DYNAMICAL SYTEMS
A discrete dynamical system [37] is defined by a difference
equation
x 7→ g(x), (1)
where x, g(x) ∈ U ∈ Rn. Discrete dynamical systems are
usually studied by means of their temporal evolution. The
temporal evolution of a discrete dynamical system is given
by the sequence of points
{x0, x1, . . . , xn} , (2)
where x0, xn ∈ U and xn is defined by
xk = g (xk−1) , (3)
for k = 1, 2, . . . , n. This temporal evolution is usually called
orbit of the dynamical system and it is going to be noted as
γ(x0).
It is also possible that the dynamics of the discrete system
depends on an external parameter or set of parameters µ ∈
V ⊂ Rp. In this case, the time evolution is
xk+1 = g(µ, xk), (4)
and the orbit associated to a certain initial condition is
γ(µ, x0) = {x0, x1, . . . , xn} . (5)
The next task is to categorize the influence of the initial
condition and the parameter or set of parameters on the time
evolution of the dynamical system. This goal does not require
an analytical determination of the orbit, since a qualitative
analysis gives enough information. The qualitative study is
based on the concept of invariant set. Let Γ be a subset of
U ⊂ Rn. Γ is an invariant set of xk+1 = g(µ, xk) if for any
x0 ∈ Γ it is satisfied that xk ∈ Γ for any k ∈ N∪{0}. Indeed,
the determination of the invariant sets associated to a discrete
dynamical system is enough information to ascertain the kind
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of orbit determined by x0 and µ. There are three types of
invariant sets:
1) Fixed point. The invariant set Γ is a fixed point when it
contains only one point x∗ such that if x0 = x∗, then
xk = x
∗ for any k ∈ N ∪ {0}.
2) Periodic orbit. In this case, the invariant set is a set of
p points {x1, x2, . . . , xp} where xi = g(µ, xi−1) and
x1 = g(µ, xp).
3) Strange attractor. The main characteristics of this kind
of invariant set are:
• Sensitivity with respect to the initial conditions.
The orbits associated to two arbitrarily close initial
conditions are totally different.
• Sensitiviy with respect to the external parameter or
set of parameters. Two orbits generated from the
same initial condition and two arbitrarily close set
of values for the external parameter(s) are totally
different.
• A non-integer dimension. A strange attractor can
not be represented neither by a curve nor by a
surface. For that reason, a new dimension concept
is introduced. This is named Haussdorf dimension.
• Ergodicity. The orbit associated to a certain initial
condition included in an small interval I ⊂ Γ covers
the whole invariant set. Moreover, for other small
interval J ⊂ Γ there exists a point in I such that
it determines an orbit that is partially included in
the interval J . Hence, the orbit generated from any
initial condition in the invariant set is as close to
any point inside the strange attractor as desired.
Those discrete dynamical systems possessing the last type of
invariant set show a very special behavior when the initial
condition and the parameter(s) are selected to be inside the
strange attractor. This behavior is called chaotic and so these
discrete dynamical systems are named chaotic discrete dynam-
ical systems or chaotic maps. Finally, the chaotic behavior is
the reason why chaotic maps are so attractive for cryptog-
raphers. Indeed, the sensitivity of chaotic maps with respect
to the initial conditions and the control parameter(s) reminds
the dependency of cryptosystems with respect to the secret
key. Furthermore, the ergodicity property of chaotic maps
implies that the probability distribution function associated
to the chaotic orbits is independent of the initial condition
and parameter or parameters values, and it also indicates that
two orbits in close proximity in a certain time lead to very
different behaviors after a transient time. In other words, the
ergodic behavior of chaotic maps could be used as the support
of both confusion and diffusion processes required by a secure
cryptosystem.
IV. THE LOGISTIC MAP
The logistic map is a chaotic map and, having in mind
the previous comments, it can be considered for the design
of new digital chaotic cryptosytems. However, the specific
characteristics of the logistic map make its extensive use not
advisable with that purpose. In order to clarify this assertion,
the dynamical characteristics of the logistic map are going
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Fig. 1. Iteration function associated to the logistic map.
to be thoroughly analyzed through the paper. First of all, the
logistic map is defined by the next equation
x 7→ f(λ, x) = λx(1 − x), (6)
where f(λ, x) : U → U , U = [0, 1], λ ∈ V = [0, 4] and xn ∈
U . Figure 1 illustrates the iteration process to generate the orbit
of the logistic when the initial condition x0 is equal to 0.2 and
λ = 3.9. On the other hand, the function f(λ, x) reaches a
maximal value for x = xc = 0.5 and it is monotonically
increasing for x < xc and monotonically decreasing for x >
xc. In other words, the logistic map is a unimodal map.
The qualitative analysis of the logistic map can be carried
out by the study of its bifurcation diagram. The bifurcation
diagram represents the asymptotic behavior of a discrete dy-
namical system. It is calculated iterating the iteration function
linked to the dynamical system for a sufficiently large set
of values of the control parameter(s) and a certain initial
condition. In the case of unimodal maps, the selected initial
condition is usually the critical point. Therefore, to calculate
the bifurcation diagram of the logistic map, Eq. (6) is iterated
from x0 = 0.5 for different values of λ. After a number of
transient iterations, and for each considered value of λ, a long
enough orbit is recorded and subsequently plotted. Fig. 2 has
been generated according to this procedure. A detailed analysis
of this bifurcation diagram leads to the following conclusions
about the logistic map:
• It has an asymptotic stable fixed point equal to 0 for
λ ∈ (0, 1).
• It has an asymptotic stable fixed point equal to λ−1
λ
for
λ ∈ (1, 3).
• For λ ∈ (3, 3.57) there exist periodic attractors of period
2m for m = 1, 2, . . .. This region is known as the
doubling-period cascade.
• For λ > 3.57 the behavior of the logistic map is chaotic
interrupted by small regions where the existing attractor
is periodic and not strange. These regions are known as
periodic windows.
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Fig. 2. Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map.
A. Considerations about the key space determined by the
logistic map
In this section it is assumed we are dealing with a chaotic
cryptosystem whose secret key contains the control parameter
λ [2], [5]–[7], [9], [20]. As it was indicated in the previous
section, if a chaotic behavior is demanded for the logistic map,
λ is required to be greater than 3.57. Nonetheless, this is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the chaoticity of
the logistic map, as it was emphasized above and as Fig. 3
shows. This graphic underlines a very important problem
when selecting proper values for λ in the case of the logistic
map. The existence of periodic windows must be avoided,
since otherwise the ciphertext would not be random-like and
resulting in an inefficient encryption procedure. This problem
has been reported and exploited for cryptanalysis purposes in
[27], [33].
The Lyapunov exponent (LE) [38] is a very useful tool to
determine if a certain value of λ makes the logistic map evolve
chaotically. It is calculated using the following equation
LE(λ) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
ln |f(λ, x)′(xk)|. (7)
Fig. 4 depicts the LE for the logistic map. Those values of λ
so the LE is greater than zero are the ones to be selected for
cryptographical issues, since they imply a chaotic behavior.
However, the LE does not grab all the periodic windows,
as it was emphasized in [38]. Therefore, it is advisable to
asses the different values of λ using other entropy measures
as the conditional entropy [39], the Wavelet-Entropy [40] or
the discrete entropy [41]. Anyway, the key space related to
the control parameter λ undergoes an important stretch due
to the existence of periodic windows, which also makes more
difficult the key selection by the users and thus the cryptosys-
tem implementation. This last fact should be avoided when
designing a new cryptosystem [42, Rule 3], and so the logistic
map should be replaced by another chaotic map that makes
easier either the key selection or the hardware implementation.
From this point of view, Piecewise Linear Maps [43] should
be considered as an alternative to the logistic map. Indeed,
Piecewise Linear Maps have a Lyapunov exponent always
positive which implies that their bifurcation diagram does not
include any periodic window, and they are the simplest chaotic
system from the implementation viewpoint.
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Fig. 3. Bifurcation diagram of the logistic map.
0 1 2 3 4
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
λ
Ly
ap
un
ov
 e
xp
on
en
t
Fig. 4. Lyapunov exponent for the logistic map.
B. Considerations about the ergodicity of the logistic map
The performance of the Baptista’s type chaotic cryptosytems
[2], [5]–[7], [10], [13], [14], [24] depends on the capacity of
the logistic map of generating orbits with a uniform probability
distribution function. Indeed, Baptista’s cryptosystem divides
the phase space of the logistic map into a number of subin-
tervals equal to the cardinality of the alphabet associated to
the messages to be encrypted. In this fashion, each interval is
associated to a character or component of the input space. Each
time a plain character is going to be encrypted, the logistic
map is iterated using the value of λ included in the secret
key until the orbit lands on the interval linked to the plain
character. As a result, the efficiency of the encryption process
requires that the probability of landing in a subinterval to be
uniform. This is the reason why the subintervals associated
to the plain alphabet in [2] are placed in [0.2, 0.8] instead of
[0, 1]. Nevertheless, if the probability density distribution of
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the logistic map is analyzed (Fig. 5), one can conclude that
the most visited places of the phase space of the logistic map
are those closer to the extremes [27, p. 174], which implies
that the encryption speed is very slow. Again, it is highly
advisable to replace the logistic map by another map with
uniform probability distribution function.
C. Considerations about the orbit of the logistic map as
ciphertext
A very important step in the design of a cryptosystem
consists in deciding what is going to be the ciphertext.
Indeed, chaotic cryptosystems transform the input information
according to a chaotic orbit and the resulting ciphertext can not
contain enough information to guess either the plaintext or the
secret key. If the ciphertext contains values of the chaotic orbit
it might be possible to infer the value of the control parameter.
This happens with the cryptosystems described in [15] and in
[20]. In [20] the ciphertext is simply the result of adding the
plaintext to a chaotic orbit. Therefore, it is possible to get
the chaotic orbit by a known-plaintext attack and, after that,
estimate the value of the control parameter using Eq. (6) [33].
Even if the ciphertext is obtained by a random sampling of
a chaotic orbit as in [15], it is possible to estimate the value
of the control parameter. As Fig. 1 informs, the maximum
value of the iteration function of the logistic map is reached
for xn = 0.5, which implies that the maximum possible value
contained in an orbit is λ/4. As a result, if one has access
to a sufficiently large sample of ciphertext derived from the
cryptosystem described in [15], then one can estimate the value
of λ using the maximum value contained in that portion of
ciphertext. Since this kind of problem is a consequence of
the logistic map having a maximum value dependent on the
control parameter, any chaotic map showing this property is
also equally vulnerable. This is the case of the Mandelbrot
map and the tent map, which are also unimodal maps with
either a minimum or maximum value dependent on the control
parameter value. In [44] this feature is used to cryptanalyze
the cryptosystem described in [45], which it is based on the
tent map instead of the logistic map.
D. Considerations about the symbolic dynamics of the logistic
map
The logistic map is an unimodal map whose critical point
is independent of the control parameter value. A first conse-
quence of this fact is that it is possible an attack similar to that
described in [27]. This attack is carried out on the Baptista’s
cryptostem and is based on the theory of symbolic dynamics
applied to unimodal maps [46]. The symbolic sequence asso-
ciated to an orbit of an unimodal map is a binary sequence
obtained by comparing each value of the orbit to the value of
the critical point. Let xk be a value of the orbit and xc be the
value of the critical point. The symbol corresponding to xk is
bk and it is given by
bk =
{
0 if xk < xc,
1 if xk ≥ xc,
(8)
In [27] it is explained how a known-plaintext attack can be
used to reconstruct a symbolic sequence associated to the
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Fig. 6. Return map of the logistic for λ = 3.9384739.
secret value of λ. This symbolic sequence can be used to
estimate either the initial condition or the control parameter
that were employed to generate it [34], [47]. A way to avoid
this problem is to use another map with a critical point
dependent on the value of the secret key or a non-unimodal
chaotic map.
E. Considerations about the return map
When observing a dynamical system, a discrete time se-
quence is obtained. Let {xk} be the sequence resulting of
the mentioned observation process. The relationship between
two consecutive values of this discrete time sequence is called
return map and it can be used to guess some characteristics of
the underlying dynamical system. Fig. 6 shows the return map
of the logistic map, which provides enough information to get
the value of the control parameter. As an example, in Fig. 6
the return map for λ = 3.9384739 is depicted, showing that
for a certain value of the control parameter the return map is
defined in an interval whose minimum and maximum bounds
are λ2/4 · (1−λ/4) and λ/4 respectively. This means that the
control parameter can be obtained through the return map, as
for example was done in [35], where a chosen ciphertext attack
on the Baptista’s cryptosystem is used to get a discretized
return map and consequently estimate the value of the control
parameter. Therefore, it is advisable to look for a chaotic map
with a return map independent of the value of the control
parameter or parameters and with xk+1 being the image of
any xk contained in the phase space.
F. Considerations about the statistical complexity of the lo-
gistic map
As detailed in [42, Table 1], another important feature
of chaotic maps is their structure complexity. Chaotic maps
are described mathematically in a very simple way but their
behavior is very complex. The complexity of any system
can be measured by using statistical tools [48]. In Fig. 7
appears the Jensen-Tsallis statistical complexity [48] of the
logistic map versus the control parameter. It shows how the
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(b) λ = 3.8947219769124
Fig. 5. Probability distribution function of the logistic for different values of the control parameter.
statistical complexity is very related to the value of the control
parameter in the chaotic region. In fact, the complexity is
almost a bijective application of the control parameter. This is
something that could be exploited by a cryptanalyst and thus it
is better to use a chaotic map with a non-bijective relationship
between the statistical complexity and the control parameter.
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Fig. 7. Statistical complexity Jensen-Tsallis of the logistic map for different
values of λ.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the logistic map has been thoroughly analyzed
and many disadvantages of its application for cryptographical
issues has been emphasized. The logistic map is an unimodal
map with an associated non-uniform probability distribution
function, which possesses a critical point independent of the
value of the control parameter and whose statistical complexity
decreases as the control parameter increases. For all these
reasons, the generalized use of the logistic map for the design
of new cryptosystems has to be discouraged, being Piecewise
Linear Maps a good alternative.
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